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RETALIATORY EVICTION: THE UNSOLVED
PROBLEM-CLORE V. FREDMAN
Retaliatory eviction' is a problem of real, not prospective, proportions
for any tenant seeking safe and sanitary housing. The problematic na-
ture of retaliatory evictions may be resolved through judicial' and leg-
islative3 relief. Absent such relief, the tenant's only alternative is to
comply with the eviction order.'
1. Retaliatory eviction is the forced ejectment of a tenant in response to the tenant's
complaint to a governmental authority of a housing code or similar regulatory violation.
The eviction may be "constructive" in that the landlord raises the rent, decreases the
services, materially alters the lease, or refuses to renew the lease, all of which are as
effective as actual physical removal from the leasehold.
2. The courts are free to usurp precedent by allowing the tenant to allege retaliatory
eviction as an affirmative defense. Professor McElhaney writes that the long-standing
resistance to changing landlord-tenant law is grounded in a more general resistance to
changing property law.
The sacrosanct intention of long dead testators and the contingent interests of
unborn landowners are not present [in landlord-tenant law] . . .
[consequently] there is no good reason why the rules of landlord-tenant law
cannot flex to meet current needs just as do rules of some contract and most
tort law.
McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and Law Reform, 29 MD. L. REV.
193, 198 (1969).
3. Due to the fact that landlords possess both economic power and statutory advantage,
legislative rather than case-by-case adjudication may better protect the tenant. Loeb, The
Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 287,315
(1970). See also F. Grad, Legal Remedies for Housing Code Violations 7-8 (The Nat'l
Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Rpt. No. 14, 1968). Legislative action is preferred
"because it presents exact standards for enforcement." Note, Retaliatory Eviction - Stat-
ute Prescribing Criminal Penalties for Landlord Reprisals Against Tenants Who Report
Violations of Housing or Health Laws Held Constitutional, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 317,327
(1970). See also Note, Retaliatory Evictions: A Study of Existing Law and Proposed Model
Code, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537, 541 (1969).
4. Forced relocation thus becomes the penalty for demanding what housing and health
codes are designed to insure, namely safe and sanitary dwelling units. While relocation
poses no problem for the more affluent middle class, it is a "particularly difficult
[problem) for the tenant of low-rent housing when burdened by insufficient funds and
a general housing shortage." Note, Retaliatory Eviction: The Tenant's Right to
Challenge the Landlord's Motive, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 986, 992 (1970). There are other
problems attendant to relocation of an urban tenant. New housing may be equally or more
undesirable; the tenant may be branded a trouble-maker and excluded from other hous-
ing; or there may be psychological injury involved in a hasty and unpleasant change in
surroundings. Comment, Protection for the Citizen Complaints to Public Authorities -
Prohibition of Retaliatory Evictions: The Case of Edwards v. Habib, 48 NEB. L. REV. 1101,
1106 (1969).
RETALIATORY EVICTION
The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Clore v. Fredman'
represents a mixed victory for the tenant in this area of landlord-tenant
law by allowing the tenant, subject to an important caveat, to allege
retaliatory eviction as an affirmative defense in a forcible entry and
detainer action6 filed by the landlord. This Note will examine the
change in Illinois law announced by Clore v. Fredman and comment on
the limitations of that decision.
The Clores rented an apartment from Mr. Fredman on a month to
month basis under an oral contract. The apartment contained numerous
violations of the Peoria Housing Code,7 which the Clores reported to
local officials. Fredman was notified of the violations but failed to rem-
edy them. The Clores began to pay their rent to the Director of the
Peoria Department of Environmental Development;8 one month later
Fredman gave notice of termination.' The Clores filed suit against Fred-
man seeking to prevent the eviction and to compel repair of the apart-
ment.10 Thereafter, Fredman commenced a forcible entry and detainer
action seeking to regain possession of the apartment. The trial court
refused to consolidate the actions and granted Fredman summary judg-
ment in his suit for possession." On appeal the court rejected the
5. 59 Ill.2d 20, 319 N.E.2d 18 (1974).
6. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, §2 (1973). A forcible entry and detainer action seeks to
quickly restore possession of land to a party when such land is being unlawfully held by
another party. See Chapin v. Billings, 91 Ill. 539 (1879); Truly Warner Co. v. Royal Indem.
Co., 259 Ill.App. 485 (1st Dist. 1931).
7. The violations, as described by the appellate court in Fredman v. Clore, 13 Ill.App.3d
903,904,301 N.E.2d 7,8 (3d Dist. 1973), included a "leaking roof, falling plaster, peeling
paint, improper wiring, [and] inadequate heat .... "
8. The Peoria Housing Code states that "[alfter inspection and due notice of violation
by the Director, any tenant. . . so long as the violation exists, may pay all rents due...
in escrow with the consent of the Director." PEORIA, ILL., HousING CODE §16-113.5 (1971).
9. Notice was given pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, §6 (1973) which provides in
pertinent part:
In all cases of tenancy for any term less than one year . . . the landlord may
terminate the tenancy by 30 days' notice, in writing, and may maintain an
action for forcible entry and detainer or ejectment.
10. The suit also named the Director of the Department of Environmental Development
and the City of Peoria. The following remedies were sought: (1) compensatory damages;
(2) an injunction against Fredman to stop the eviction and to repair the apartment; (3)
an injunction against the Director of the Department of Environmental Development to
inspect and report future violations and to require the Director to continue to accept rent
payments; and (4) attorney fees and court costs. Relief was denied by the trial court and
the appellate court affirmed. Clore v. Fredman, 13 Ill.App.3d 913, 301 N.E.2d 15 (3d Dist.
1973).
11. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's refusal to consolidate stating that
the Clores failed to meet the statutory requirement of identity of parties and causes of
action. Fredman v. Clore, 13 Ill.App.3d 903, 906, 301 N.E.2d 7,9 (3d Dist. 1973). See ILL.
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Clores' defense of retaliatory eviction'" stating that the equitable defense
was not "germane" to a forcible entry and detainer.'4 A strong dissent
was filed by Justice Stouder.'5
REV. STAT. ch. 110, §48(c) (1973). The supreme court eventually ruled that while the
motion for consolidation was discretionary, it should have been granted. "The cases con-
tain common questions of law and fact which could and should have readily been deter-
mined at the.same time." 59 Ill.2d at 28, 319 N.E.2d at 22 (1974). This ruling is of special
significance because it eliminates the necessity of pursuing two separate suits through trial
and appeal.
12. 13 Ill.App.3d 903, 301 N.E.2d 7 (3d Dist. 1973).
13. The appellate court considered the Clores' claim of retaliatory eviction to be "self-
serving" and a "mere allegation . . . not sufficient to create a material issue of fact." Id.
at 907, 301 N.E.2d at 10.
14. In controversy is the statute governing the nature of a forcible entry and detainer
proceeding. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, §5 (1973). The statute provides in part that "[n]o
matters not germane [i.e., not pertinent to the issue of possession] to the distinctive
purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder, counterclaim, or otherwise
.... " The statute has been used to preclude numerous defenses on the ground that they
were inapposite and not germane to the issue of possession. See Burton v. Firebough, 344
Ill. App. 548, 101 N.E. 2d 616 (1st Dist. 1951) (excess rent paid by tenant not permitted
as an offsetting defense); Truman v. Rodesch, 168 Ill.App. 304 (2d Dist.1912) (tenant
precluded from raising defense of breach by landlord of an independent covenant to supply
heat). Recent decisions have to some extent, ameliorated this position. See Peoria Housing
Authority v. Sanders, 54 Ill. 2d 478, 298 N.E. 2d 173 (1973) (where action for possession
is based on non-payment of rent, question of whether rent is due is germane); Rosewood
Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill.2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970) (validity and enforceability of an
installment contract for purchase of real estate was germane to issue of possession where
possession was pursuant to that contract). See also notes 16-18 and accompanying text
infra.
15. Justice Stouder argued that the defense was germane by stating:
It is hard to imagine how a defense alleging that the landlord terminated a lease
and is seeking possession in retaliation and in violation of a statute, can be said
to be collateral to the distinctive purpose of a forcible entry and detainer action.
The defendants are merely seeking to assert their paramount right to possession
by stating facts upon which they base their right.
13 Ill.App.3d at 911,301 N.E.2d at 13 (Strouder, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he recog-
nized that statutory authority aimed at preventing retaliatory eviction did exist in the
form of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80 § 71(1973) which declares retaliatory evictions to be against
public policy and the PEORIA, ILL., HOUSING CODE §16-118 (1971) which sets out the re-
quirements for establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory eviction; see notes 22,32 and
accompanying text infra. In support of his position Justice Stouder cited the cogent
reasoning of Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969) (a landlord cannot evict a tenant when the eviction is in retaliation for the tenant's
reporting of sanitation and housing code violations), and Schweiger v. Superior Court of
Alameda County, 3 Cal.3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970) (where an eviction
or rent increase is sought in retaliation for the reporting of violations of the civil (housing)
code, a defense of retaliatory eviction may be raised). The supreme court made note of
these two cases in the majority opinion in Clore. 59 Ill.2d at 27,319 N.E. 2d at 22.
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On review by the Illinois Supreme Court, attention was initially fo-
cused on the question of whether the defense of retaliatory eviction was
"germane"' ' to a forcible entry and detainer action. 7 The court reviewed
its previous opinions. In 1970, in Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher8 the validity
and enforceability of an installment contract was held germane to the
proceedings. Two years later the supreme court determined that both
express and implied warranties in a lease were germane to an action in
forcible entry and detainer in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little." Then in 1973
in Peoria Housing Authority v. Sanders,"0 allegations that a rental policy
was unconstitutional were held germane. While each of these cases
could be easily distinguished from Clore on the facts, the court chose
not to do so.
After citing the recent Illinois decisions on the issue of germaneness,
the court examined the statutory law regarding retaliatory eviction. The
Illinois statute2' codifies the principle that the eviction of a tenant who
complains of a housing code violation contravenes public policy. The
court in Clore reasoned that the Illinois statute, in conjunction with the
Peoria Housing Code, 22 could only be interpreted to preclude the land-
lord's right to evict in retaliation. 23 Emphasis was placed on the fact that
an opposite conclusion would "nullify the clear intent of the statute. ' '2 4
16. See note 14 supra.
17. 59 Ill.2d at 25, 319 N.E.2d at 21.
18. 46 Ill.2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970).
19. 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). The appellate court in Fredman v. Clore
attempted to distinguish the Spring case on the ground that the suit for possession was
based on a different statute than the suit in Clore. 13 Ill.App.3d at 908,301 N.E.2d at 11.
The supreme court did not discuss the distinction, apparently unconvinced of its signifi-
cance.
20. 54 Ill.2d 478,298 N.E.2d 173 (1973).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, §71 (1973) is as follows:
It is declared to be against the public policy of the State for a landlord to
terminate or refuse to renew a lease or tenancy of property used as a residence
on the ground that the tenant has complained to any governmental authority
of a bona fide violation of any applicable building code, health ordinance, or
similar regulation. Any provision in any lease, or any agreement or understand-
ing, purporting to permit the landlord to terminate or refuse to renew a lease or
tenancy for such reason is void (emphasis added).
22. PEORIA, ILL., HOUSING CODE §16-118 (1971). The section reads in part:
No owner or lessor shall evict or cause to evict or terminate the tenancy of a
rentor or lessee solely as retaliation because that rentor or lessee complains to
the City of Peoria or the Circuit Court of Peoria County against the owner with
violation of this Code or with violation of any warranty of habitability accruing
to the rentor or lessee from the owner . ...
23. 59 Ill.2d at 26-27, 319 N.E.2d at 21.
24. Id. at 27, 319 N.E.2d at 21.
19761
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Therefore, notwithstanding the exclusive nature 5 of a forcible entry and
detainer proceeding, the court decided that the affirmative defense of
retaliatory eviction was germane and could be pleaded." However,
pleading the defense and proving the defense are different actions.
The obstacle in the path of proving the defense arises from the court's
caveat that "this conclusion [i.e., that the defense is germane] is predi-
cated upon the pertinent statutory and ordinance provisions [the Illi-
nois Act and the Peoria Code] . . . ."I Read literally this could mean
that absent the Illinois statute or the Peoria Code the defense might not
have been allowed. That is a rather narrow interpretation of the court's
holding and perhaps a dubious one.2 However, it may be that in a
practical sense the two enactments are necessities. 9
Under the Illinois statute four requirements must be met to prove the
eviction retaliatory: first, a "bona fide" housing code violation must
exist; second, a report of the violation must be made to a governmental
agency; third, the landlord must be aware of the report to the agency;
and fourth, the landlord must have terminated or refused to renew the
lease because the tenant filed the report." This burden of proof placed
on the tenant is formidable.'
In Clore a prima facie case of retaliatory eviction was set out by the
Peoria Housing Code: 2 whenever a tenant is evicted within six months
25. In the past, the sole issue in a forcible entry and detainer action was the right of
possession. See note 14 supra.
26. 59 Ill.2d at 27, 319 N.E.2d at 22.
27. Id. at 27, 319 N.E.2d at 22. The court noted that "other courts have reached similar
conclusions without such enactments." Id. See text accompanying notes 34-39 infra.
28. See TENANTS RIGHTS (Ill. Inst. CONT. LEGAL EDUC. ed. 1975) 2-16 to 2-46 [hereinafter
cited as TENANTS RIGHTS]. The section on Substantive Defenses cites Clore, without
qualification, for the proposition that "the defense of retaliatory eviction may be raised
in a Forcible Entry and Detainer action predicated upon the serving of a thirty (30) day
Notice to Quit . Id. at 2-16. This implies that statutory and ordinance provisions
are unnecessary.
29. The Illinois statute will always be available to an Illinois tenant provided it is
included in the pleadings. Pleading the statute is necessary to show the public policy of
the state.
30. TENANTS RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 2-31 to 2-33.
31. Of the four requirements the most difficult to prove is the fourth, i.e., the landlord
terminated or refused to renew the lease because the tenant complained of a violation.
As noted in TENANTS RIGHTS at 2-33, the nature of proof is "purely subjective." See
TENANTS RIGHTrs at 2-31 to 2-37 for a fuller explanation of the four requirements and the
proof required under each one.
32. PEORIA, ILL., HOUSING CODE §16-118 (1971). The applicable part of the section reads:
The fact that the rent or lease consideration of the rentor or lessee is not more
than thirty (30) days delinquent at the time the owner gives notice of eviction
or termination of lease or rental and the fact that, within six (6) months prior
[Vol. 25:522
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of his complaint to the appropriate governmental agency of a housing
code violation, that is evidence of a retaliatory eviction. Under the Peo-
ria Code there is no need to allege a "bona fide" housing code violation,
nor is the tenant required to show that the landlord was aware of the
complaint or that the eviction was based thereon.
The Illinois Supreme Court easily found "facts . . . sufficient to pres-
ent the issue of retaliation" in Clore, because the Peoria Code had set
out the requirements for a prima facie case of retaliation.33 The Peoria
Code thus served as a vehicle for presenting the defense of retaliation.
At trial its provisions facilitated the proof of the defense. Without such
a vehicle a tenant would have to meet the general requirements of proof
under the Illinois statute. That task, aside from its difficulty, may in
addition prove futile since to date no cases report the successful use of
the Illinois statute to sustain a defense of retaliatory eviction. Therefore,
a Peoria-type ordinance or a state statute with provisions similar to
those of the ordinance, provides the tenant with a tool which in practice
is of immense value.
Common law resolutions of the problem of retaliatory eviction
are not unusual. The court in Clore took notice of two such deci-
sions in other jurisdictions where the defense was sustained with-
out reliance on statutory or ordinance provisions. 4 Jurisdictions
permitting a common law retaliatory eviction defense include the
District of Columbia, 5 California,"5 New Jersey,3" New York,3" and
to the notice of eviction or termination of the lease or rental, the rentor or lessee
has not been convicted of creating a nuisance at the dwelling or dwelling unit
from which eviction is sought. . . shall be prima facie evidence that the eviction
or termination of lease or rental by the owner is solely retaliatory because that
rentor or lessee has complained against the owner charging him with violation
of this Code ....
33. 59 Ill.2d at 27, 319 N.E.2d at 22. In addition, the court observed:
[the fact that] the Clores alleged they made complaints, violations were found
and Fredman was notified . . . [and that] the Director of the Department of
Environmental Development notified Fredman that rental payments on the
Clores' apartment would be held in escrow until violations were corrected...
[was] sufficient to raise the issue of retaliation...
34. The two decisions cited at 59 Ill.2d. at 27, 319 N.E.2d at 22, were Edwards v. Habib,
397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969), and Schweiger v. Supe-
rior Court of Alameda County, 3 Cal.3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal.Rptr. 729 (1970); see note
15 supra.
35. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C.Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
See note 15 supra.
36. Schweiger v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 3 Cal.3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970). See note 15 supra.
37. Alexander Hamilton Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 N.J. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7
(1969) (defense of retaliatory eviction allowed despite absence of local ordinance; notwith-
standing state statute in effect, the court relied upon common law theory of equitable
defense to action for possession).
38. Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc.2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1971), citing Edwards
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Wisconsin.39 Public or broad legislative policy forms the basis for most
of the decisions. Should Illinois allow the defense without predicating
its decision on statutory provisions but on policy reasons, its decision
would be consonant with the jurisdictions cited."
Most states, however, have eliminated the need for common law rem-
edies by enacting suitable protective measures. An examination of such
protective legislation, on a state by state basis is facilitated by Figure
1.1' Generally, state statutes protect the tenant who complains to a
government agency whether that agency is a local municipality, regional
housing authority or state board of health.2 While some states protect
the tenant who complains directly to the landlord 3 or requests repairs,"
other states fail to afford this protection.45 For this reason, some tenants
have joined together to form tenant unions. This collective action pro-
vides the individual tenant with greater economic power over the land-
lord. However, less than half of the state statutes surveyed in Figure 1
protect tenant union activity.
v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969) (defense of
retaliatory eviction could be raised where the tenant was served notice to vacate shortly
after the tenant reported housing code violations to local officials); Markese v. Cooper,
70 Misc.2d 478,481,333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 67 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (strong public policy of maintain-
ing decent habitation required that a long-term tenant who was served with notice of
eviction following complaint to housing authorities be allowed the defense of retaliatory
eviction; the court specifically noted that the defense was permitted absent local ordi-
nance).
39. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis.2d 389, 397, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1970) (although no
ordinance, regulation or statute prohibited retaliatory eviction, per se, the intent of public
policy was rehabilitation of slum areas and that intent would be frustrated if a landlord
could evict in retaliation).
40. It is possible that Illinois may follow these jurisdictions in providing common law
remedies to the problem of retaliatory eviction. Such a course of action is advocated
herein, see text accompanying notes 59-62.
41. Figure 1 is not meant to serve as an all-inclusive list of states affording protection
against retaliatory evictions. The statutes described were selected for representative pur-
poses only.
42. See Figure 1 infra. Every state listed protects the tenant in this situation.
43. Id. All surveyed states, with the exception of Illinois, Maine and Massachusetts
specifically provide protection to the tenant who complains to a landlord.
44. Id. Connecticut, Hawaii and the District of Columbia afford protection upon a
request for repairs.
45. However, it is this writer's opinion that in the future courts will interpret statutes
to include complaints to a landlord.
46. See Figure 1 infra. Those states protecting tenant union activity include Arizona,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts and New Jersey.
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Eviction is not the sole retaliatory action that may be taken against
the tenant. Rent increases,47 service decreases,"s or material alterations"
of the lease have been used as retaliation for tenant complaints. If a
statute precludes material alteration of the lease, a specific provision
prohibiting service decreases is usually absent, apparently on the as-
sumption that a service decrease will be covered by the broad language
of "material alteration." However, it is clear that the "material altera-
tion" language does not encompass rent increases which are tantamount
to an eviction for most low and fixed income tenants. Accordingly, most
state legislatures specifically prohibit such increases5
The award of attorney's fees is an important facet of some of the
statutes surveyed.5 ' Attorneys are encouraged to defend forcible entry
and detainer actions by the promise of reasonable fees. This provision
affords the tenant greater access to legal services, while decreasing the
burden on legal aid offices. An additional impetus to enforcement is
provided by fixed statutory periods which set up a presumption against
the landlord. That is to say, during the statutory time period any action
by the landlord to evict, raise rent, decrease service or alter the lease is
presumed retaliatory.52 The presumption is generally rebuttable, or in a
rare case, irrebuttable.53 If rebuttable it may be overcome by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
An analysis of the surveyed state statutes reveals the gross inade-
quacy of the Illinois statute. As characterized by the authors of the
Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code, the Illinois statute is
"toothless." 5' Until Clore the statute had never been critically evalu-
ated. While this was primarily due to the roadblock of section 5 of the
47. Id. Illinois and Maine are the only states listed which do not protect the tenant from
a retaliatory rent increase.
48. Id. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota and the District of Col-
umbia offer protection to the tenant from a retaliatory service decrease.
49. Id. Four of the surveyed states, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey and Rhode
Island, provide the comprehensive protection from a retaliation in the form of a material
alteration of the lease.
50. See note 47 supra.
51. See Figure 1 infra. Only Hawaii, Maryland and Massachusetts provide for an award
of attorney's fees.
52. Id. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey and the District of Columbia provide time periods ranging in length from 60
days to six months in which any eviction oriented action on the part of the landlord will
be presumed retaliatory.
53. The Connecticut statute sets out what is essentially an irrebuttable presumption
by stating that no action may be brought by the landlord during the six month period.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §19-375a (Supp. 1975).
54. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE 70 (1969).
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Illinois forcible entry and detainer statute,55 which allows only "ger-
mane" defenses, 6 that explanation does not redeem the act.
Illinois was once considered a leader in providing protection to tenants
subjected to a landlord's retaliatory eviction. The Illinois legislature had
officially denounced retaliatory eviction as against public policy twelve
years ago," however, the courts heretofore have refused to allow the
defense of retaliatory eviction. It was not until Clore v. Fredman that
the Illinois Supreme Court restored some of the protection intended
under that 1963 Act. However by grounding the Clore holding on the
requirement of ordinance and statutory provisions, the supreme court
failed to provide full and adequate protection to all tenants faced with
a retaliatory eviction. In practice the Clore decision can have no benefi-
cial effect upon residents of communities where an ordinance similar to
that of Peoria does not exist. For example, the residents of the City of
Chicago remain unprotected from a retaliatory eviction.58
The Illinois General Assembly should take the initiative to resolve the
tenant's dilemma. Considering the supportive case law, statutes and
model acts, Illinois can readily find a basis to rewrite its retaliatory
eviction statute. 9 The new statute should at least have the force of the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act."0 Prospective legislation
does not, however, aid the tenant who will currently be evicted for
having sought safe and sanitary housing. Accordingly, as a stop-gap
measure, the Illinois Supreme Court should in the next appropriate case
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, §5 (1973).
56. See notes 14-15 supra.
57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1973), declaring retaliatory evictions to be against
public policy was enacted in 1963. See note 21, supra.
58. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 78, §§ 11-20 (1973) (Housing Code). There
is no provision in the Chicago Housing Code, nor is there a municipal ordinance of any
kind prohibiting retaliatory evictions. Of New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago, only
Chicago residents are left unprotected. See Figure 1 and note 59, infra.
59. At least 24 states and the District of Columbia have enacted provisions designed to
preclude retaliatory eviction. See Figure 1, infra; see generally, ALASKA STAT. §34.03.310
(Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §5516 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§83.56, 83.60 (Supp.
1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (1974); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS tit. 23, §§8950, 8609 (Supp.
1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §1700-1 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §55-248.39 (Supp.
1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §59.18.240 (Supp. 1975).
Three bills governing retaliatory eviction were introduced in the last session of the
legislature; none of the bills progressed beyond committee. See S.B. 909, 79th Ill. Gen.
Assembly (1975) (Introduced Apr. 10, 1975); H.B. 1550 and H.B. 1477, 79th 11. Gen.
Assembly (1975) (Introduced Apr. 9, 1975).
60. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §5.101. See Figure 1, infra. The
Act covers most of the important facets of retaliatory eviction. However, the Act does not
protect the tenant from a material alteration of the lease, nor does it provide for the
recovery of attorney fees.
[Vol. 25:522
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establish realistic guidelines for proving a prima facie case of retaliatory
eviction absent a Peoria-type ordinance. The supreme court has re-
moved the obstacle of "germaneness;" it must now act to revise the
language of the Clore decision by formulating a case law counterpart to
the Peoria ordinance which would be available to all Illinois tenants. In
light of the support for the defense of retaliatory eviction evidenced by
other courts"' and legislatures," the Illinois Supreme Court and the
Illinois General Assembly can and should realistically remove the last
barricades to safe and sanitary housing.
Edward F. Novak
61. See notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
62. See note 59 supra.
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